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I will offer some observations on the question of whether we need an
international lender of last resort. And my answer will be yes, as long as
we start putting the emphasis on last. We have had too much of an
international lender of ﬁrst resort in recent years, with too much lending
from our international lender of last resort, the International Monetary
Fund. Probably a package of measures and redesign could be undertaken
to reduce the need for a real international lender of last resort, but in the
ﬁnal analysis we are still going to require one. Circumstances will arise
where it will be important, even after we have taken better steps to take
the burden off the IMF concerning the number of cases that it has to
handle.
Analytically, a number of arguments can be distinguished for a
lender of last resort in general, although they all come to the same basic
theme, which is, of course, the concept of a true liquidity crisis. Among
theorists, this concept is regarded with some skepticism, although I think
that the case for it is quite strong. A liquidity crisis, in the most general
sense, I would take to be a circumstance where a borrower cannot obtain
short-term funds despite the fact that the rate of return on the short-term
borrowing would exceed the market cost of capital. For some reason the
market mechanism has broken down, and the borrower cannot obtain
funds, even though there is, depending on the model framework or the
conceptual framework, an equilibrium in which that ﬂow of funds ought
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ence.to take place. Such a liquidity crisis can be identiﬁed in at least three
distinguishable cases, and it is important to keep them separate.
IDENTIFYING LIQUIDITY CRISES
The ﬁrst, I would say, is ﬁnancial panic. Financial panic is a
circumstance where the level of short-term indebtedness is very high
relative to short-term liquidity and, for whatever reason, a market
equilibrium unfolds in which the short-term debt is called. And the
borrower has no recourse to reﬁnance the short-term debt. From a
theoretical point of view, this is the kind of framework that we use to
analyze bank runs in a domestic economy. It has also become one of the
favorite vehicles for trying to understand a range of international crises,
from Mexico to East Asia, in the last few years.
What has distinguished all of the international emerging market
crises, in my view, is that they have hit countries where the level of
short-term indebtedness to international banks is high and, in particular,
where this short-term debt is a multiple of the value of foreign exchange
reserves. For whatever reason, something triggers a massive withdrawal
of the short-term capital. The trigger occurs in part because of the very
observation that short-term liquid assets are not sufﬁcient to cover the
short-term debts, and you get a self-fulﬁlling liquidity crisis as a result.
Now that interpretation is much debated, but it is the one that I would
strongly favor for understanding these crises.
A second kind of liquidity crisis, which I would suggest is different
from a ﬁnancial panic, is a debt overhang liquidity crisis. By that I mean
a case where you have a bankrupt debtor that still needs working capital.
This concept is well-understood in bankruptcy law; just because you are
bankrupt does not mean you do not need funds. In Chapter 11, we have
Section 364 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which is the debtor-in-
possession ﬁnance vehicle. It provides a mechanism for the bankruptcy
court to get short-term working capital to the bankrupt, understanding
that markets cannot do it because any new creditor knows that without a
special legal regime to cover the new lending, any new loans just get piled
onto the massive mountain of bad debt.
This is a liquidity crisis according to the deﬁnition that I gave
beforehand, but it is quite different from a panic because nobody is
panicked, necessarily; you just have a bankrupt debtor that cannot get
normal market access. This situation can be a case for a lender of last
resort, as well. But as the bankruptcy law shows, you do not necessarily
need a lender of last resort, you need a legal regime, in order to get
working capital in such a circumstance. To apply that idea to the current
context, of course, I am thinking about sovereign bankruptcy, about
governments that are ﬁnancially insolvent but still need working capital.
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The third kind of liquidity crisis that I would distinguish is a class of
problems that are very real but somewhat different from the other two.
For want of a better title, I call this public sector collapse. The idea is that
basic public order, the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, its
ability to collect taxes and to provide basic public goods like law and
order, collapses at various points in many countries around the world. It
could be the result of a revolution, civil strife, a struggle for indepen-
dence. In this very messy world that we live in, lots of states cannot
perform as states, even to collect the minimal amount of tax revenues
needed to run themselves. The collapse may not reﬂect an overhang of
bad debt, and it certainly need not reﬂect a ﬁnancial panic. But it still can
create a condition that I would deﬁne as a liquidity crisis, where the
return to working capital is very high, in that such funds would allow the
state to consolidate its basic power, a step that may be vital to the survival
of people in the midst of civil strife. And in that case also, the markets
probably will not provide liquidity, and you may need a lender of last
resort that is able to tie the loans to a consolidation of state power within
the international system.
ROLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LENDER OF LAST RESORT
When we think about what the IMF actually does as our interna-
tional lender of last resort, and how it does it, I ﬁnd it helpful to
distinguish these three types of cases and then to try to think through
whether we have a reasonable regime for them. So, again, we have
ﬁnancial panic, debt overhang, and public sector collapse. Clearly, in
response, an international lender of last resort will have multiple poten-
tial roles, at least analytically. Four come to mind from this three-way
classiﬁcation I just gave, because ﬁnancial panic has two parts to it.
First, an international lender of last resort is supposed to forestall
panic, simply by being there. One of the major functions of a lender of last
resort is that you stop the panic from ever happening, in principle,
because everybody says “No reason to panic, there is a lender of last
resort standing in the background.” So that is potential function number
one. Potential function number two is to lend into a ﬁnancial panic that
is already occurring; thus, we see the Thai or the Indonesian or the
Korean loans of the second half of 1997.
The third potential role of a lender of last resort is to lend into a debt
overhang. By analogy, in the bankruptcy context, under American law,
for example, we usually allow the bankrupt to gain access to working
capital by prioritizing the new lending, the post-bankruptcy debt, under
Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, we have the IMF lending
into a bankruptcy situation, where the IMF is already assigned a
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working capital into a bankruptcy situation. And the fourth potential
role, of course, is to lend into a situation of public sector collapse, to help
a state to consolidate power in a way that private markets will not be able
to ﬁnance.
ALTERNATIVES TO A LENDER OF LAST RESORT
Now having noted these multiple roles, it is also immediately
evident that many functional alternatives to a lender of last resort exist. In
every one of these categories, other ways can be found to handle the very
same problem. And if we are going to analyze properly what the IMF, for
example, should do, we should understand these different ways to handle
the problems. So let me just run through them very brieﬂy.
In Forestalling Financial Panics
First, forestalling a ﬁnancial panic. Let us recognize that a number of
ways exist to prevent a ﬁnancial panic from happening in the ﬁrst place.
If you believe, as I do, that the essence of the recent crises was a very high
level of short-term debt relative to liquid assets, which ended up
triggering a panic because of a devaluation or bad political news or
contagion, then the alternative to a lender of last resort is direct
mechanisms to prevent the debt-to-reserve ratios from getting out of
whack, reaching levels of two to one, for example, as in Asia in 1997 or in
Latin America in 1994. Now for that reason, I believe that controls on
short-term capital inﬂows to banking sectors of emerging markets, for
example, make eminent sense. Direct limits, as a prudential measure, not
as global macro capital controls but as a prudential measure, seem to me
to be eminently sensible.
I also happen to believe that ﬂexible exchange rates are the appro-
priate response, because if you actually look at the histories of these
crises, in virtually every case a period of exchange rate pegging led to a
drain of reserves, which caused the ratio of short-term debt to liquid
assets to skyrocket. I do not see any compelling case for any of this
pegging to begin with. And I also think that for many, many reasons,
almost none of these countries qualify as part of an optimal currency area
with any of the major industrial countries.
So my view is that prudential limits on capital inﬂows plus ﬂexible
exchange rates would have prevented a great many of these crises from
ever having come to pass. With these two changes, the burden on the
international lender of last resort could have been relieved. I should add
that here, as in many other areas, we probably had a massive unintended
consequence of our own regulatory environment. The BIS capital ade-
quacy standards that give a risk-weighting of only 20 percent to interbank
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short-term claims, which fueled the emerging market boom and after-
ward caused the emerging market bust.
So, as a contribution to the crisis, I would put a not inconsiderable
weight on the BIS regulations, which are too asset-oriented and not
adequately liability-focused in the ﬁrst place. They do not focus on the
risk of liquidity crises. And second, they cause a sharp bias toward
short-term lending, because of the way that we do the risk weighting in
the capital adequacy standards, giving such low risk to interbank
short-term loans. These standards have made the whole system more
vulnerable to ﬁnancial panic.
In Handling a Financial Panic
Now in terms of handling a ﬁnancial panic, beyond preventing
panic, functional alternatives to IMF lending also exist. The ﬁrst one is
suspension of payments. Instead of just lending large amounts of money
to a country in the midst of a panic, one alternative is that the country
stop paying on the short-term debt. While that idea may sound horrify-
ing, that is of course how most of these crises actually end. The Korean
crisis did not end on December 4, 1997, when a $57 billion IMF package
came into shape, but on December 29, 1997, when the Fed engineered a
rollover of short-term debts and everybody breathed a sigh of relief that
we were no longer playing on a day-to-day basis in Korea. So the normal
way that these panics end is not necessarily through infusion of new
capital, but rather suspension of repayment of short-term debt. This
outcome has a hallowed history in ﬁnance, both domestic and interna-
tional. It is not the horrifying element that it seems to be, but often a
natural way that short-term panics get resolved.
Even in the 1999 Brazil crisis, I think one of the best parts of the
rescue package was the informal agreement that the commercial banks
would keep their lines of credit in place. In other words, we saw not a big
lending package but rather an agreement not to take out funds. This is
how, I think, normal banking ought to work in these contexts. The idea
that big bailout packages are needed would be much less persuasive if the
banks would agree to stand pat as a normal part of their behavior (which
I think they would do, by the way, if the IMF were not in there telling
them that they can get everything out). All in all, it seems to me normal
that banking should proceed through suspension or orderly rollover of
outstanding debt.
In Debt Overhang Crises
If I turn to the third category requiring lender of last resort loans, the
debt overhang case, here again we ﬁnd functional alternatives to IMF
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privileged position in lending when a mountain of debt is already
present. What are the functional alternatives? First is the option of a
standstill on debt repayments. Of course, the normal ﬁrst thing in a
bankruptcy workout is to stop the outﬂow of debt repayments. At this
moment we still do not have an international regime that can handle
standstills appropriately. I think it is a terrible, terrible loss in the current
system that obviously bankrupt debtors can be absolutely pursued,
without any recourse to a standstill.
Second, instead of an IMF loan, we could arrange debtor-in-posses-
sion ﬁnancing, a ` la Section 364. A key point is that you do not need an
ofﬁcial creditor to lend. The bankruptcy judge does not make an IMF-
style loan; what the bankruptcy judge does is to say that the next $100
million tranche is going to have priority over the pre-bankruptcy debt.
And we could have an international system that set these priorities. I
think such arrangements would have an advantage over the current
regime, where we only put in ofﬁcial money in such bankruptcies,
because it would keep the action closer to the market. And you would
still have a market test on lending. We do not have an ofﬁcial mechanism
for giving priority to new loans, but it is at least conceivable that we could
authorize an international regime to make such arrangements.
The third point about a debt overhang is that in domestic bankruptcy
law you end up by canceling debt. We do this in the international system
through the Brady plan or through Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) programs, or through other devices, but we do it just dreadfully.
And I say, as one who has been watching the process for 15 years, one can
name 25 countries where it was obvious for more than a decade that they
were bankrupt before the debt was actually canceled. Yet the process
drags on for 10 or 15 years before we acknowledge the fact, because we
still do not face up to sovereign bankruptcy.
We have no concept for sovereign bankruptcy, we have no regime
for it, we fake it, until the political pressures become intolerable or until
the Ponzi scheme ﬁnally reaches the point where you simply cannot ﬁnd
anyone to lend more money to pay off the old debt. That is the situation
we are in with 42 HIPC countries right now, but we are still playing the
Ponzi game with them. One way to relieve the burden on an international
lender of last resort would be to actually get rid of bad debt. And we do
not have a clean system for doing that yet.
In Public Sector Collapse
Then ﬁnally, we get to the fourth category, public sector collapse. It
is conceivable, of course, that you could have J.P. Morgan syndicates that
could lead the recovery of societies undergoing civil strife, but I do
believe, from my own experience in a lot of crisis countries and from
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IMF or some other public agency is absolutely needed. When you have
desperate humanitarian conditions and you have states that do not
function as states, you cannot rely on private markets to sort out the
consolidation of public power. So it seems to me that this is a clear case
where the IMF or something like it has a vital role to play, and where the
IMF has often played it decisively.
EVALUATING OUR CURRENT SYSTEM
Let me conclude by asking, given the foregoing, how we are actually
doing currently. In terms of preventing ﬁnancial panic, I think we do
very, very poorly. First, we have too many pegged exchange rate regimes.
The IMF has championed many of them, as in Russia in 1997 or Brazil at
the end of 1998. These were situations where it was clear the currencies
were on the verge of collapse and yet we lent money, even to sustain
collapsing currencies. This action just invited a ﬁnancial crisis, by
allowing countries to run out of reserves.
Second, I think we have handled short-term debt very badly. Both
the BIS regulations and the way that liberalization has been done have
exposed vulnerable countries to massive amounts of short-term debt.
Third, I think that the way that the IMF has intervened, in situations
where the panic is just starting, has often inﬂamed the panic or exacer-
bated it rather than calmed it. In a lender of last resort circumstance,
subtlety and art are of the essence, and so maybe bailing out Long-Term
Capital Management makes sense if you are worried about a rapidly
growing liquidity crisis and want to stop the panic. I happen to believe
that was a good call. Closing 16 commercial banks on November 1, 1997,
in Indonesia, when there was no deposit insurance, is what I would call
a bad call. It set off one of the most virulent banking panics in modern
history in Indonesia, and it is one of the reasons the country ended up in
ﬂames. So in terms of preventing ﬁnancial panic, I would give very low
marks to the current system. It is just not geared toward addressing the
real issues that cause these panics to take place.
In terms of handling ﬁnancial panics, here again the evidence shows,
if you look at it dispassionately, that the big bailout loans have generally
not functioned very well. Some have said they have not functioned
because they have been too small, even though they were very big in
dollar terms, but in any event they certainly have not stopped the outﬂow
of capital. That was true, interestingly, even in the Mexican bailout, which
was probably the cleanest of all of these rescues and the one where the
U.S. Treasury put in the most money. It was not that the money that was
put up stopped the panic through a return of conﬁdence. No, the money
was drawn down to repay the outﬂow in short-term capital, pure and
simple. After it was gone, then conﬁdence started to return.
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the $41 billion for Brazil, the $22 billion July 1998 program for Russia, the
Mexican bailout, in no case actually stopped the outﬂow of ﬁnancial
capital. What I think has been more successful, actually, is rollovers of
debt. When the situation gets bad enough, the Fed calls in the parties and
says, “Everybody smile, we’re rolling over the debt.” And when this
happens, it seems to me it has had a wonderful effect. All of a sudden, in
a weird kind of way, the press says, “Ah, we avoided default.” Of course,
that is default. But since we put such a pleasant smile on it, conﬁdence
gets restored. So the magic of managing crises is exactly that—you call
them something else, and then the myth becomes that we avoided default
in Korea. Fabulous, if that is what you want to say, do it. And it works,
it works a lot better than the ﬁrst $57 billion worked, because that did not
stop the panic; that led to a miserable Christmas weekend for Rubin and
Summers in 1997, precisely because Korea ran out of money and therefore
forced the Fed to act.
So in terms of handling panic, I do not think we have done a good
job. The tactics are inﬂammatory, the big bailouts do not work, and now
we are going toward what are called private sector bail-ins, as if this idea
is anything more than a normal market response, which is a much better
way in general.
In terms of debt overhang problems, there are many. Probably 40 or
more countries around the world have governments that are really
insolvent right now. We play a very complicated institutional interna-
tional game, but it does not work very well because we have no
international regime for insolvency of sovereign governments, compara-
ble to Chapter 9 for U.S. municipalities. I will not elaborate, except to say
that this problem has been going on for about 150 years, and it remains
true today. We are playing games, at very, very high costs.
Finally, let me stress that in circumstances of public collapse, as I
mentioned before, the stakes are usually extremely high. The IMF
recently inaugurated new contingency lending mechanisms for countries
in conﬂict or in immediate post-conﬂict circumstances, and I want to
applaud that initiative because these are often the most delicate human-
itarian circumstances in the world. It is extremely important to get money
into those countries, to consolidate state power as fast as possible.
Bottom line, do we need an international lender of last resort? The
answer is yes, because we are always going to have liquidity crises. But
do we need an IMF that is managing 70 countries around the world? The
answer is no. The reason we have such an institution is that we have
made no provision for discharge of unpayable debt. That keeps an
endless routine of IMF programs going. We have also allowed the highly
volatile short-term capital to rule the system in recent years, through
dangerous exchange rate and capital account policies. The combination has
made these ﬁnancial panics much more prevalent than they need to be.
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